The Israeli — Turkish Rapprochement

By Spyros N. Litsas, Ph.D*

It comes to no surprise that Israel and Turkey are taking measured diplomatic steps to gradually leave behind the thorny period between them that emerged immediately after the Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 by the IDF. What followed afterwards, R. Erdogan insulting S. Peres at the World Economic Forum in January 2009, the Mavi Marmara violent incident in May 2010, or the deliberate blow of the cover of a Mossad ring in Iran by the Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı [MIT] in 2012, are key events that had profoundly shaped the diplomatic status between the two states and the geostrategic physiognomy of the Eastern Mediterranean within the last decade too. Nevertheless, nothing is permanent in the volatile anarchic international environment. Turkey is an important regional factor, it can offer a ground passage to the gas pipelines from the Middle East to Europe, while, apparently, it may also regulate up to a certain extend Hamas’ hostile activities against Israeli targets. It is not a secret that Israel and Turkey are in a process of exploring mutual ways to reheat their old positive arrangement simply because such a development can offer mutual gains to both. However, is this true?

I have to clarify that as a Greek academic I do not think that a future Israeli-Turkish rapprochement may harm the already strongly established Greek-Israeli relations, despite the fact that Ankara will apply considerable pressure on this via ‘Sharp Power’ operations. Perhaps, the shortest reply to this is that Ankara is already doing this so nothing will change at this level. I theoretically advocate against the zero sum game reasoning in international politics. The international arena is based on a variety of multidimensional procedures running in a parallel mode and thus discarding what I call the ‘Highlander Fixation’. International systemic structure promotes instead abundant dynamic and progressive diplomatic affairs with a tendency to move both in parallel and perpendicular directions. Having said all these, I need also to stress out that Greece is a member of NATO and of the EU and can offer different, yet comparably more advanced, benefits to Israel compared with those that Turkey can or is willing to do. However, the future of the Greek-Israeli relations will be the topic of another article.

Thus, the re-emergence of the Israeli-Turkish connection may not necessarily harm the Greek-Israeli one. After all, both Greece and Israel are status quo states and their participation in the international arena do not correlate with the illusion of ‘there must be only one’ as Gregory Widen’s story of Highlander presents cosmic immortal warriors to combat each other up to the point where only one of them will remain standing on the planet of Earth. In spite of that, can Israel-Turkish relations be equally beneficial for both?

I argue against this. First, nowadays Turkey is to a great extent disoriented from Kemal Ataturk’s main thesis regarding the placement of the state in the international chess- board. Pro-western exclusivity is not an option anymore for Ankara and this can be clearly seen in the Turkish-Russian diplomatic modus vivendi and in particular in cases such as the S-400 purchase or the impressive entrance of ROSATOM in Turkey’s domestic energy market. What Turkey truly wants from Israel is a ‘letter of recommendation’ that is safe for the West to start once again to consider Turkey as a part of the league. Is Erdogan’s Turkey ready to return back to the western arms? No, since Turkey’s dependency from Russia or Qatar is influencing the nation’s choices in the international scene. Is Turkey willing to change course in order to meet western values and expectations somewhere in the middle? Definitely No, since neither the Turkish President nor his entourage feel comfortable with this prospect. Should Israel guarantee for Turkey’s diplomatic rehabilitation? Heavens, No, for all the above mentioned reasons. On top of that Israel has cleverly opened up to the Kurdish element both in Syria and in Iraq. Must the state abandon such a useful connection, since Turkey will eventually demand from the Beit Aghion to turn its back to the Kurds? Is Israel ready to send such a message of political inconsistency to the Iranian or the Syrian Kurds? On top of that, many influential Arab states have developed extremely poor relations with Turkey, mainly because the latter has decided either to pair with Iran, or to make use of Jihadists fighters as a proxy element to fulfil its short-term geostrategic goals in the region, e.g. Libya and Syria. Is Israel willing to jeopardize its relations with the Sunni Arab world just for the eyes of the Anatolian wolf?

After the formation of the new coalition government of Netanyahu — Gantz certain circles in Israel, as in other western states as well, promote the viewpoint that Turkish revisionism is a product of Erdogan’s long stay in power instead of an ontological symptom of how the nation perceives its collective reflection since the collapse of Ottomanism and the establishment of Kemalism. Such an approach easily disregards the fact that since 1923 Turkey feels uncomfortable in its post-imperial suit, while the deep state, almost immediately after Ataturk’s death, considered that the nation had a greater mission to fulfill at a global level than being absorbed in a continuous regional balancing between a narcissistic idealization of the past and the hardships of the Eastern Mediterranean politics at a daily base. Perhaps it is essential to go back to the fundamentals of International Relations Theory to comprehend that any arrangement of harmonious co-existence between a revisionist state such as Turkey and a status quo state such as Israel is practically unrealistic, ethically controversial and politically paradoxical. Since Israel seems realistically unwilling, for such a goal is above its weight, to convince Turkey that revisionism may only harm the fragile balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean with dire consequences for all the involved parts, the most probable scenario is the former to be obliged to consume a large part of its national prestige to differentiate from the geostrategic choices of the latter on a daily basis. This will require time, sources and great diplomatic effort from the Israeli part while Turkey will continue to bring forward its revisionist self.

Last but not least, all these analysts who are patiently anticipating the conclusion of Erdogan’s political career are clearly missing the complexity of Turkish domestic politics. Since the end of the Menderes’ era radicalism is a strong ideological pole in Turkey, being accommodated by the powerful Army cliques and literally obliging all the mainstream parties to walk hand — in — hand with extreme or rogue political elements in order to maximize their power or simply survive in this Hobbesian terrain. This is a political reality that had been further enhanced during the AKP’s era, despite the wild expectations of western analysts, academics and diplomats during the early years of Erdogan in power. For instance, the reason behind the fact that the Nationalist Movement Party [MHP] enjoys a high level of political leverage that goes far beyond its popularity percentages to the Turkish electorate can be found in the co-existence status between radicalism and mainstream political ethos and practice. As a matter of fact, a prequel of what future holds for Turkey was revealed a few weeks ago when Meral Aksener publicly linked the People’s Democratic Party [HDP] with the PKK, opening the exit door for her political organization from a new coalition with the Republican’s People Party [CHP] in the near future. This clearly weakens the electoral prospects of the Kemalist Party, while it strengthens the anti-Israeli block of various populist and extreme right wing parties in the highly polarized Turkish political scene. In other words, all those who patiently await for Turkey to return back to the days of the Israel-Turkish honeymoon period of the Cold War era have to consider again about the perplexities of the 21st century’s international politics and also about the deep and genuine revisionist character of the Turkish state which is not just an ideological stance of some of the prominent members of the Turkish political elite but the state’s ontological credo that may lead Turkey to even darker alleys than the ones is currently moving. Has Israel to gain more than to lose from a rapprochement with Turkey? I argue against this. Nevertheless, such a development may prove to be negative not just for Israel but for the wider region of the Eastern Mediterranean too. My main preoccupation with this rapprochement is that instead of being able to lead Turkey, if something like that is possible, to more democratic routes, Turkey will be given the opportunity to continue with its aspirations to transform the Eastern Mediterranean to a lake of perpetual friction since it cannot be a Turkish lake. At the end of the day, Mavi vatan does not only turn against the Greek national interests but also against Israel’s too since it will limit the buildup of new advanced Maritime Grand Strategy.

*Spyros Litsas is Professor of International Relations at the University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki, Greece and Visiting Professor at the Supreme Joint College of War of the Hellenic Armed Forces.